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Abstract
This article examines the relation between two key, but seemingly opposed concepts 
in Jan Patočka’s thought: epoché and the concrete institutional polis. In doing so it 
attempts to elucidate the inextricable relation between phenomenology and politics 
in the work of the Czech philosopher, and illustrate more broadly the possibilities 
for approaching the political from a phenomenological perspective. The article pro‑
vides a phenomenological interpretation of “care for the soul” as closely linked to 
Patočka’s reformulation of the core phenomenological notion of epoché. It argues 
that in Patočka’s work, the epoché, traditionally conceived as a radical stepping back 
from the world must be rendered differently, not only as a negative freedom, but 
as the foundation of positive politics. Thus, the authors argue that there is a the‑
matic and conceptual continuity between Patočka’s phenomenological studies and 
his political work.
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Introduction
Politics played a central role in the development of Jan Patocka’s philosophy, per‑
haps even more than for any other phenomenologist of his generation. It is remark‑
able then that no clear political theory emerges from his work.1 This can in part 
be explained by the distinctly phenomenological form that Patočka’s thinking about 
politics took, especially in its later developments. In his later work, reflection on 
politics is parsed through the Socratic and Platonic idea of “care for the soul,” which 
he interprets as a constant examination and moral enhancement of one’s own deeds 
and speech (Patočka 2002a, p. 120). The task of politics and of the polis is to “care 
for the soul,” specifically to construct a true community of justice, i.e., a polis where 
a “Socrates does not need to die” (Patočka 2002a, p. 121).2 Moreover, care for the 
soul is given a distinct phenomenological sense inasmuch as it poses a question 
about manifestation: “Care of the soul is fundamentally care that follows from the 
proximity of man to manifesting, to the phenomenon as such, to the manifesting 
of the world in its whole, that occurs within man, with man” (Patočka 2002a, p. 
27). This proximity is understood both as a privilege, as it allows human beings to 
acknowledge the existence of a world as a unitary field of appearance (and not just 
of clusters of discrete entities) and as a duty, as this world needs constant care if 
we want it to survive and want to thrive in it. Such care translated into the attempt 
of organizing this world through the foundation of a “polis”: a social and political 
space where people can co‑exist and interact in a peaceful and just fashion, but also 
where the way that the world appears can be constantly interrogated. Constructing 
the polis in a manner that allows for the constant interrogation of that construction 
is therefore one of the ways in which we implement the phenomenological attitude 
of care for the soul. This link between political deed and phenomenological attitude 
explains why Patočka can argue in the Heretical Essays in The History of Philoso-
phy that “The question of human social being is in the first place a phenomenologi‑
cal question” (Patočka 1996, p. 148).
According to Patočka’s interpretation, phenomenology properly understood has 
at its core the task and activity of the epoché (Patočka 1995, pp. 163–210; Patočka 
2002a, p. 15; Patočka 2015a; Patočka 2019). Tackling the question of human social 
being phenomenologically implies rendering this epoché, which is traditionally con‑
ceived as a radical stepping back from the world, in a different fashion—not only as 
the negative freedom that we gain by refraining from judgement on any positing and 
that allows us apprehend ourselves purely, i.e. as free from the limits of the natural 
attitude that we usually occupy (Husserl 1983, pp. 59–60; 1967, p. 60), but also as 
the foundation of positive politics. The elaboration and development of this line of 
argument from within the framework of Patočka’s phenomenology is something that 
2 Interestingly, Hannah Arendt, one of the main theoretical points of reference in Patočka’s masterwork, 
The Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, envisioned a similar function of politics while analys‑
ing Plato’s political theory in her essay on Socrates (Arendt 2013).
1 On the complex relationship between philosophy and politics in Patočka’s thought, see in particular 
Bernard (2016a, b), Caraus (2016), Leufer (2017), Tava (2015) and Tava and Meacham (2016).
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Patočka himself never does beyond a brief but important reflection in the appendices 
of the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, where he affirms the necessity 
of transcending the alleged negativity of Husserl’s pure phenomenology (Patočka 
1996, p. 152). The aim of this article is to elaborate the interdependence between 
Patočka’s phenomenology and his political thought by examining the role that the 
idea of epoché plays in his positive political thinking about the nature of the polis. 
Our question is if and how the idea of epoché can be reconciled with the polis as an 
institution within the framework of Patočka’s phenomenology. Phenomenology, for 
Patočka, becomes inherently political with the understanding that the proper site of 
the “care for the soul”—for Patočka the proper activity of phenomenology—is the 
polis. Politics should also be understood as inherently phenomenological. Taken at 
face value, it seems obvious that the political has largely to do with the manner in 
which other people, communities, and institutions appear to us and how we appear 
to ourselves in relation to these others: politics is about intersubjective relations and 
the institutions that structure them. What our argument maintains is that properly 
political activity—in this phenomenological sense—implies a specific relation or 
coming into contact with the world and its processes of manifestation. Following the 
thrust of Patočka’s thought, this relation can be described via a reformulated idea of 
epoché.
The emphasis on the epoché as a constitutive activity of the polis seems to be in 
conflict with the polis as institutional, i.e. as constituted by stable sense‑formations 
often having a supporting material superstructure.3 In Patočka’s characterization 
of the historical and social existence of humankind, these sense‑formations belong 
to what he called the second fundamental movement of human existence, i.e., the 
moment when people establish material institutions through labors that allow them 
to sustain themselves in a hostile environment (Patočka 1989, p. 256. See on this 
also Srubar 2002, p. 317). The epoché as understood within Patočka’s phenome‑
nology entails a shift in focus from sense‑structures as given and operative within 
the horizon of the world to an examination of their processes of coming to appear‑
ance and the genesis of their constitutive powers. In this same line, we can interpret 
another important aspect of Patočka’s philosophy, i.e., the shift from what he calls 
the second to the third movement of human existence, the latter being the move‑
ment of truth, i.e., the moment when human intellectual gaze moves from individual 
sense‑structures to appearing as such in terms of the epoché (See,  Barbaras 2007; 
Kouba 2007). Thus a secondary question for this article is how the idea of epoché 
is situated within Patočka’s theory of the three movements of political life, and how 
this in turn impacts his political thinking. Where politics is discussed in a norma‑
tive sense within Patočka’s work, it is almost always in terms of the de‑construction 
of stable social structures of meaning in their givenness and function: “the shaken 
certitude of pre‑given meaning” (Patočka 1996, p. 118). In the language that he uses 
in Plato and Europe and in The Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History the 
3 For instance, parliament as an institution qua sense structure is supported by parliament the building 
or a national education or health care system is a sense‑structure that is supported by its material super‑
structure of schools, universities, hospitals, clinics, etc.
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tension between epoché and institution is expressed in two normative propositions: 
on the one hand is the injunction that we find in Plato and Europe to cultivate the 
soul so that the possibility arises of forming a state or community where the Socratic 
figure is not a pariah (Patočka 2002a, p. 121); on the other is Patočka’s rendering of 
the Socratic task itself, to refuse the “measures of mobilization” which make the 
state of war permanent, but without offering “positive programmes” (Patočka 1996, 
p. 135). This de‑constructive stance translates, in the Heretical Essays, into a pecu‑
liar understanding of the polis and of the political that could be defined as essen‑
tially agonistic (Caraus 2006). For Patočka,
"[t]he spirit of the polis is a spirit of unity in conflict, in battle. One cannot 
be a citizen—polites—except in a community of some against others, and the 
conflict itself gives rise to the tension, the tenor of the life of the polis, the 
shape of the space of freedom that citizens both offer and deny each other in 
seeking support and overcoming resistance” (Patočka, 1996, p. 41–42).
This agonistic understanding of the polis can be interpreted as a political imple‑
mentation of the phenomenological principle of the epoché. The question then is 
whether and to what extent a political institutionalization is possible following this 
agonistic approach.4
The tension between epoché and institution can also be recognized in the oscilla‑
tion between reflection on the seemingly abstract and often philosophically technical 
topics of care for the soul, manifestation, and epoché on the one hand, and concrete 
political events and institutions on the other  that marks the entirety of Patočka’s 
oeuvre. To understand the orientation of Patočka’s political thought in its relation 
to phenomenology more abstract texts as one finds in Plato and Europe and The 
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History should be analyzed alongside the con‑
crete reflections on the state of European and global politics, political liberalism, 
and human rights that one finds (published) in the texts and notes on the concept 
of post‑Europe (Patočka 1988) and also most famously in his texts on the Charta 
77 movement: “The Obligation to Resist Injustice” and “What We Can and Cannot 
Expect from Charta 77” (Patočka 1989, pp. 340–347). Our contention is that the 
tension between epoché and institution in Patočka’s thought is thus not an inconsist‑
ency but a productive relation that is precisely the site of politics properly under‑
stood. This leaves open the question as to what kind of concrete institutions and 
specific conception of the epoché allow for this productive tension. Put otherwise, if 
the central task of a phenomenological politics is to undermine the certainty and sta‑
bility of the polis’ institutions by interrogating their processes of manifestation, how 
can those institutions maintain themselves in anything like what we might recognize 
as a polis?
Patočka was attentive to this tension in his later political writings, e.g. “Intellec‑
tuals and Opposition” (1969) and “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual” (1975). 
In the latter, the distinction between epoché and institution is transposed onto the 
relation between these two figures. Neither is to be taken in the sense of abstract 
4 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to address this issue.
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character types. The spiritual man and the intellectual were concrete persons, liv‑
ing and working within the context of contemporary Cold War European politics, 
literally embodying the tension between epoché and institution. In “Intellectuals and 
Opposition,” Patočka reflects on the concrete role of intellectuals in political opposi‑
tion, offering analysis of the events in Prague and Paris in 1968, as well as the stu‑
dent anti‑war movement in the US.
In what follows, (1) we will first provide an account of the meaning and func‑
tion of epoché in Patočka’s political phenomenology. In doing so, we highlight how 
the epoché is related to the concepts of neutralization and reduction, why and to 
what extent epoché  is important to the socio‑historical and political being of the 
human, and how it relates to the notion of institution. Finally, (2) we will analyze 
how the tension between epoché and institution plays out in Patočka’s concrete con‑
siderations of political opposition and the role of intellectuals within the polis. This 
examination allows for a clarification of the relationship between two key concepts 
in Patočka’s work, and for a clearer understanding of what political phenomenology 
within the framework of Patočka’s philosophy entails. Thus, we argue that there is 
a thematic and conceptual continuity between Patočka’s phenomenological studies 
and his political work.
Nonetheless, any proposal for an iterable or normalized political epoché is likely 
incompatible with Patočka’s own political thought, which is too firmly rooted in 
the historical context of political dissidence in the Czechoslovakia of the 1960s 
and 70s to allow for direct application to contemporary democratic institutions. 
Patočka’s involvement with Charta 77 is often understood as an important excep‑
tion from Patočka’s non‑involvement in institutional politics (Čapek 2009; Leufer 
2017). But the aim of Charta 77 was to ensure that the Czechoslovakian government 
recognized its various international and constitutional human rights commitments. 
The document itself carefully stipulated that Charta 77 was not an organization and 
“does not form the basis for any oppositional political activity” (Havel et al. 1985, p. 
221). Thus Patočka’s signing and support of the Charta does not indicate a shift into 
organized and institutional politics, although, Ivan Chvatík has argued that Patočka’s 
political thought and indeed hopes were travelling in the direction of trans‑national 
democratic institutions (Chvatík  2004). Our argument here is that a development 
of the concepts of both epoché and institution in relation to the political enables a 




It is important to distinguish in a fine‑grained manner how the term epoché is used 
by Patočka. This is best accomplished with the help of two related terms in Hus‑
serlian phenomenology: neutralization and reduction. According to Husserl, a neu‑
trality modification is a suspension of the “general thesis” of the natural attitude 
which bestows natural‑empirical validity (realness) upon the world and objects of 
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perception (Husserl 1983, pp. 257–259; on this topic, see also Fink 1966, 68–72; 
De Warren 2015, pp. 248–251). In other words, it is a suspension of the implicit or 
tacit belief in the empirical realness of the world that accompanies sense‑perception 
and judgment. Husserl is careful to emphasize the radicality of this modification by 
insisting that it is not to be understood in the sense of making the object dubitable 
or merely hypothesized (Husserl 1983, p. 258). It does not bring the tacit judgement 
of “realness” into doubt, but suspends it. The neutrality modification “completely 
annuls, completely renders powerless every doxic modality to which it is related” (p. 
257—our emphasis). It “annuls” any motivational force stemming from the thesis/
judgement of “realness.” Hence, one would be ill‑advised, for example, to enact such 
a modification on the world while facing oncoming traffic. From Patočka’s stand‑
point (though he does not discuss the neutrality modification by name), such a ren‑
dering powerless allows for a shift in the character of attention directed toward the 
object. Rather than seeing it in terms of what it is and does, an object of experience 
can now be studied in terms of how it appears and does what it does (phenomeno‑
logically). Rather than being motivated to move out of the way of oncoming traffic, 
we can examine how it is that the traffic appears in such a manner that would indeed 
motivate such movement. If we think of the object as a stable sense‑structure, what 
it does is to structure the horizon in which it sits by delineating itself against other 
object sense‑structures, including subjects and the general horizon of the world. This 
delineating against, and in so doing having an impact upon the constitution of other 
objects and the field of appearance as a whole, is its power. In “Lectures on Cor‑
poreality” (1968–1969), Patočka writes: “Each thing acquires its figure—delimits 
itself—becoming, in relation to others. This becoming traces the frontiers of other 
things, it is a process of definition, of putting into form. This definition is made vis‑
à‑vis all the other things, every thing is co‑defined” (Patočka 1995, p. 114). It is this 
process which is revealed in Patočka’s understanding of the epoché; how appearing 
objects co‑define one another, and in so doing institute a world as a unified field of 
appearance. But in enacting this shift of attitude or stance toward the object and its 
constituent features “the posited characteristics become powerless” (Husserl 1983, 
p. 258). The epoché can be understood first as a neutrality modification with a uni‑
versal scope: the relevant modification is carried out to the whole of the world and 
its objects. Consequently, the epoché makes the entirety of the experiential field 
available for phenomenological analysis.
The epoché is traditionally understood (Husserl 1967, p. 21; 1983, p. 60) as a 
moment within the phenomenological reduction insofar as it opens the possibility 
for the world and its objects to be studied in terms of their invariant or essential 
features qua experiences by overcoming the “naive” natural attitude (Husserl 1970, 
pp. 143–151). Under the reduction, as a further phenomenological “step,” the world 
and its objects are examined as correlates to the constituting acts of consciousness. 
Patočka rejects this understanding of the residuum of the epoché and seeks to restore 
to the idea of the phenomenological epoché its methodological dignity as a universal 
neutrality modification apart from its being a moment of the reduction. In his essay 
“Epoché and Reduction” (2015a), Patočka is clear that the epoché is not a moment 
on a path leading to a sphere of “being or pre‑being, whether it is worldly or non‑
worldly”—transcendental subjectivity in its constituting power—but rather reveals 
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the world horizon as the a priori of appearance, and subsequently a condition for the 
appearance of the subject itself as a worldly object among and conditioned by oth‑
ers. It is, he says, “access to appearing as such, instead of to what appears. Instead 
of attending to what is manifest, we suspend it in the epochē, in order to bring into 
view for the first time what makes manifest” (Patočka 2015a, p. 48–49).5 Further 
direct and indirect references to the theme of the phenomenological epoché qua neu‑
trality modification can be traced in Patočka’s works—from “Negative Platonism” 
(1950s) where he analyzes the Platonic concept of “chorismos,” which indicates the 
peculiar way in which ideas are separated from real objects (Patočka 1989, p. 180; 
see on this Tava 2015, pp. 5–6), to “What is Phenomenology” (1976–1977), where 
he claims that the epoché “more radically conceived, opens the way to the being 
of beings of every mode of being” (Patočka 2019, p. 96). In what follows we will 
clarify the impact of this conception on Patočka’s approach to political institutions.
Epoché of political institutions
We can now link this understanding of the epoché more clearly to the political, 
and more specifically to political institutions, broadly speaking, as a specific type 
of object. What Patočka refers to when he talks about the discovery of the politi‑
cal in its proper sense (Patočka 1996, p. 38–39) is the epoché of institutions—com‑
munity, tradition, myth, to this we would add as paradigmatic examples of political 
institutions like nation‑states, universities, parliaments, national health care systems, 
primary schools, and perhaps most fundamentally subjects themselves. Institu‑
tions are formal objects in the sense of cultural objects as Husserl describes them 
in the second book of the Ideas: the physical instantiation or iteration of the object 
is animated by the “spiritual sense” (Husserl 1989, p. 249), which is the result of 
ongoing processes of generative or historical constitution. The spiritual side of such 
objects is “fused” to their material appearance. Certain types of institutions can be 
understood as infrastructural in that they play a structuring role that underpins and 
mediates other processes of appearance. Nations, communities, and foundational 
myths are paradigmatic examples of what we call infrastructural institutions. It is 
in this sense that infrastructural institutions are constitutive of forms of collective or 
social historical life. The political epoché that we argue Patočka envisaged in his late 
works is a neutralization of these infrastructural institutions inasmuch as it reveals 
their “uprootedness” and “lack of foundation” (Patočka 1996, p. 39). The neutraliza‑
tion of the infrastructural institutions in the discovery (and perduring) of the politi‑
cal qua epoché destabilizes the sense of the lifeworld, which is structured in its value 
orientation by its infrastructural institutions. In this sense, the neutralization of the 
formal objects that are our infrastructural institutions is also subsequently the neu‑
tralization of the sense of corresponding cultural forms of life facilitated by these 
institutions. By opting for this peculiar form of political epoché, people suspend (at 
least temporarily) those forms of life that Patočka characterized in terms of mere 
5 On Patočka’s account of “appearing as such” and on his understanding of phenomenological epoché, 
see in particular Karfík (1998) and Novotný (2003).
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acceptance and defence of their status quo—historical cultural meaning that is taken 
for granted—and that usually crystallize into traditional social and political institu‑
tions (parties, nations, etc.), and rather opt (however briefly) for a new form of life 
that is devoid of all these infrastructures, and therefore free and “reaching forth” 
(Patočka 1996, p. 38).
The residuum of the political epoché
The residuum of the political epoché is an embodied perspective upon a field of 
appearance that by dint of the possible movement of the perspective, in relation to 
pragmatic engagement, is also a field of possible manifestations. It is by moving, 
being oriented by practical and value‑laden poles of engagement, that things qua 
meaning‑structures come into the world. But the movement of the body, which is 
constitutive of appearance, is not a solitary activity. The possibilities of appearance 
opened up by our movement have, as condition of their possibility, another perspec‑
tive—another body—that serves as a binary pole to stabilize phenomena and make 
them worldly, i.e. belonging to an objective field of appearance that appears to me 
as not contingent upon my own perspective. This stabilizing effect that the other 
body has also makes possible the appearance of my own body as an object within 
the field of appearance. For this reason, the appearance of the world and its stability 
or verification must pass through the other with whom I engage and interact. Con‑
sequently, the first meaning structure toward which the moving body is oriented is 
the other body. This process of bringing a world to appearance through movement is 
also defining of the embodied‑subject itself, which like all other objects defines and 
delimits itself in relation to all other things in the world. The sense of the lived body 
is not a given but an individuation within the field of possibility. This contingency of 
the embodied subject is revealed in the epoché.
In this shaking or epoché of sense‑structures, Patočka claims that a more pro‑
found meaningfulness is discovered at the core of the epoché. The relation between 
movement and appearance amounts to the discovery of both freedom and responsi‑
bility over the manifestation of the world. Freedom does not reside in the projection 
of possibilities, but in the assumption of responsibility for the movement that creates 
the sense of the world (Patočka 1995, p. 117). Freedom is in this way both made 
possible and constrained by embodied movement and the others in relation to whom 
a body moves and comports itself. The freedom that lies at the residuum of the epo‑
ché and hence at the heart of the political is also the possibility to (re)infuse a life‑
world with value orientation, i.e. with a certain conception of the good that is fused 
with the infrastructural institutions of a particular cultural lifeworld. What Patočka 
emphasizes repeatedly, and what he sees as his own criticism of Husserl’s concept 
of the lifeworld is that the field of appearances is from the start value‑laden, it is 
always a world that is “for the sake of…”—a world of good and evil (Patočka 1989, 
p. 235). The idea of the good should be understood here in terms of human flourish‑
ing. To say that a lifeworld is oriented, via its infrastructural institutions, toward a 
conception of the good is to say that it is oriented, however indeterminately, toward 
a specific conception of the good life and of human flourishing.
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The responsibility that Patočka refers to here is not solely for one’s own actions, 
pragmatic engagement, and valuations, but for the character of the overall value‑
orientation of the field of appearance and its infrastructural institutions. The “for 
the sake of” in this sense is both vague and indeterminate, but also entirely con‑
crete, sensible, and institutional. The sensible materiality of the lifeworld is imbued 
or fused with the sense of the good proper to a particular lifeworld. To use a term 
borrowed from Merleau‑Ponty, the orientation toward the good that marks a particu‑
lar lifeworld appears “in filigree” (Merleau‑Ponty 1968, p. 215) like a watermark on 
the institutions that structure the appearance of a lifeworld by mediating the possi‑
bilities of appearance qua movement within the field of appearance or world. What 
the political epoché accomplishes in its neutralization of a lifeworld’s infrastructural 
institutions is not only to open to investigation the constitutive processes by which 
these institutions are both constituted and constituting in relation to the field of 
appearance, but also reveal the conception of the good which traverses these institu‑
tions in filigree as contingent upon these processes, opening its sense to phenomeno‑
logical investigation.
The concrete paradox of Patočka’s political phenomenology is that he seems to 
want to provide the ground for ungrounding, i.e., construct the polis where Socrates 
will not be killed, but do so by radically ungrounding the sense of all the institu‑
tions of the polis. What is left, concretely speaking, is a new community bound by 
their shared interrogation of the manifestation of the infrastructural institutions of 
the concrete polis. In the Heretical Essays Patočka uses the expression “solidarity of 
the shaken” to describe this new community. The difficulty is that there he explicitly 
says it is not a community that proposes “positive programmes,” despite its discov‑
ery of the positive freedom and responsibility of the epoché. We will discuss this 
below in Sect. 2.
Care for the Soul as the Political Epoché
The above highlighted the main characteristics of Patočka’s understanding of 
the phenomenological epoché and pointed out its potential political usage. In 
what follows we argue that the political epoché as described above is the best 
way to understand the rather opaque but politically significant idea of “care for 
the soul” (Patočka 2002a, p. 15) which  permeates Patočka’s later writing. The 
relation between the epoché and care for the soul can be put in the following 
way. Patočka’s concept of soul must be understood phenomenologically as the 
field of movement and appearance. Or, put otherwise, as the world. Patočka 
legitimizes this interpretation in Plato and Europe when he writes that the soul 
“stands at the boundary of the visible and the invisible” […] “[n]aturally, the 
soul under consideration is not the soul of the individual, but rather the soul of 
the world” (Patočka 2002a, p. 187). In the Heretical Essays he continues this line 
of thought: “The care for the soul is the practical form of the discovery of the 
Whole […]” (Patočka 1996, p. 82). There are two senses of the world that are 
important here. First, the world as the a priori horizon of all appearance; and sec‑
ond, the world as the mundane field of appearance and practical engagement. The 
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soul as the boundary between the visible and the invisible concerns the relations 
between these two senses, and specifically Patočka’s understanding of Being as 
the movement of appearance between the poles of retreat and non‑retreat against 
the a priori horizon of appearance (Patočka 2002a, p. 187). Being is the move‑
ment by which individual existents come to appear against the a priori horizon 
of the world‑structure. And it is the movement of the motile body in its practical 
engagement with its surroundings that mediates Being as manifesting and retreat‑
ing. So, care for the soul involves two intertwined movements, that of the body 
and of appearance. This emphasis on bodily movement as the authentic dimen‑
sion of Being is a recurrent topic in Patočka’s phenomenological works, and char‑
acterises the complex relationship between the existential motion of the individ‑
ual and appearing as such qua fundamental backdrop against which such motion 
is staged. In a lecture that he gave in Freiburg in 1968, Patočka made it clear that 
in his understanding existential movement eschews any traditional definition of 
subjectivity and objectivity. By moving into the world, by experiencing it and 
modifying it, by making their dwelling in it, humans constantly overcome their 
status of subjects and develop a horizon of possibilities that they might decide 
to engender: “the act does not stay in subjectivity, but has its own plan, its own 
consequence and residue in the exterior world” (Patočka 1980, p. 13; see on this 
Tava 2015, pp. 81–87). For Patočka, the dimension of this movement is also the 
dimension of human freedom. In this sense, caring for the soul means taking care 
of this freedom, i.e., of the human ability to freely establish itself within this 
ever‑changing field of appearance.
The epoché is the methodological tool or process through which the soul qua 
world or field of appearance is discovered and interrogated in terms of its processes 
of manifestation. Understood phenomenologically, the question of care for the soul 
is a question of the relation between humans or humanity and manifesting as such 
(Patočka 2002a, p. 27). Why humans in the plural and why a world soul and not an 
individual soul? Simply put, for Patočka the phenomenologist, the world is an inter‑
subjective accomplishment. The world coming to be what it is for our individual 
souls is a social activity. It is movement in relation to other motile bodies that phe‑
nomenologically individuates subjects; i.e. allows for the appearance of individual 
subjects. The manifesting of the world, the proper activity of the soul, is prior to and 
constitutive of individual subjectivities. This is what is referred to as the “a‑subjec‑
tive” dimension of Patočka’s phenomenology: inter‑corporeal movement precedes 
subjectivity, which is only generated as a sense‑structure (an institution) from move‑
ment (Patočka 2015b). The subject is then not only what cares for the soul, but also 
what is cared for. Care for the soul includes as a fundamental dimension attention 
to and interrogation of the processes of subjects coming into appearance. Moreo‑
ver, care is characterized by an attitude of responsibility for and freedom over the 
movement that brings the world of things, motile subjects included, into being. This 
freedom has both a negative and a positive determination. It is negative insofar as 
the epoché implies a stepping back from the world as given; the subject is freed 
to examine the processes that bring it into existence. And it is a positive freedom 
insofar as the stepping back and examination of the "how" of processes of appear‑
ance alerts us to our power over these processes (Husserl 1970, p. 144), even insofar 
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as the interrogation undermines the structural stability of the subject itself. We are 
not simply passive bystanders to the world’s processes of appearance, but rather can 
play an active role through the movement of our bodies, which is expressive and 
delineating of sense‑structures. Care for the soul is through and through a phenom‑
enological notion in Patočka’s thought.
In Plato and Europe, care for the soul is linked explicitly to the proper activity of 
the polis (Patočka 2002a, b, p. 88). This adds a further degree of specificity: it is a 
particular attention to the processes of appearing within a particular historical con‑
crete lifeworld (a world of human praxis) and moreover the assertion of responsibil‑
ity over the appearing of those institutions which play what we’ve called an infra-
structural role in the overall intersubjective accomplishment of the lifeworld. This 
politically phenomenological sense of care for the soul is again connected to the 
idea of the good or value‑orientation that permeates a particular historical lifeworld 
and results from the constitutive power of its infrastructural institutions. Care for the 
soul thus acquires, politically and institutionally speaking, a positive and negative 
sense: it is the construction of a polis or set of infrastructural institutions that allows 
for a phenomenological interrogation of the sense of the good that permeates those 
same institutions. It is, as Patočka says, the construction of a polis where Socrates 
does not have to die. Positively, care for the soul then entails the formation of infra‑
structural institutions that have built into them the facilitation of the neutralizing of 
their own constitutive power, opening the possibility for the appearance of new or 
altered institutions, including the institution of the subject itself. Truth in politics 
becomes a question of “the manner in which things manifest themselves” (Patočka 
2002a, b, p. 26), and the way into this question is the phenomenological epoché, 
now recast in Patočka’s thought, like in Husserl’s, as the contemporary iteration 
of the fundamental and normative “heritage of Europe”: care for the soul (Patočka 
2002a, b, p. 14).
From shaking to new institutions
If the political is understood as epoché in these terms, that is, if the core of political 
activity does not entail the construction and maintenance of institutions but rather 
a radical interrogation that ungrounds their validity qua formal objects and forms 
of life, then Patočka’s theory seemingly faces a similar problem of “motivation” 
to Husserl’s theory of the reduction: if the lifeworld as both a horizon and assem‑
blage of meaning‑structures shows itself to us in the manner of stable givenness, 
i.e. being real or true, what motivation would there be to interrogate its processes of 
appearing?
Patočka’s response to this is best approached through the idea of “shaking.” As an 
operative concept in Patočka’s thought shaking is nearly synonymous with his idea 
of the epoché: an ungrounding of the validity of any pre‑given historical sense—
institutions—that forms particular lifeworlds. What distinguishes shaking from a 
traditional conception of the epoché is that it is not a methodological step under‑
taken by the subject, but something that the subject succumbs to; the epoché qua 
shaking is an involuntary experience that thrusts the subject into the harsh light of 
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the political properly understood. Another way to put this is that to be shaken is to 
undergo a forced conversion after which none of the institutions of pre‑political life 
retain their stability. Going beyond Patočka, what we wish to argue is that the cen‑
tral challenge of the political—a challenge intrinsic to the meaning of the political 
itself—is precisely to maintain this specifically political form of epoché, shaking, or 
care for the soul outside of its involuntary context; i.e. to normalize or institution‑
alize a shift of attention that ungrounds all institutions and in doing so evades all 
normalization. To show this point, we will clarify what Patočka means by “shak‑
ing” in the context of his analysis of modernity. We will then outline the conceptual 
shift that emerges in Patočka’s Heretical Essays from the “shaking” to the so‑called 
“solidarity of the shaken,” which can be interpreted as Patočka’s main attempt to 
overcome the involuntary context of this shaking experience and pave the ground to 
a new institutionalization of the political. Finally, we will look at other examples in 
which Patočka articulates this positive outcome of his political epoché by focusing 
on the concept of political opposition and on the role of dissident intellectuals in this 
context.
The shaking and the front
In the Heretical Essays, Patočka provides a critical analysis of modernity, whose 
final and most dramatic outcome is represented by the World Wars of the twentieth 
century. The paradigmatic experience of “shaking” that Patočka envisaged here cor‑
responds to the experience of soldiers in the trench warfare of the First World War. 
For some soldiers who withstand death, madness, and perhaps also ideology, the 
shaking of the front line experience becomes the political analogue of the epoché, 
inasmuch as it compels them to dispel all those meaning‑structures on which every‑
day life is built and to experience first‑hand the same suspension of judgement that 
the phenomenological epoché enables.
“The first phase” of this shattering experience, Patočka writes, “is the experience 
of meaninglessness and unbearable horror. The front line is absurdity par excellence 
[…] all that humans hold most precious is torn to shreds” (Patočka 1996, p. 126). 
We can see here a concrete description not of a methodological bracketing but rather 
an involuntary destruction of the meaning‑structures of the lifeworld in terms of a 
particular world of historically transmitted cultural sense and in terms of the life‑
world as a universal structure of all cultural worlds. What is lost is not merely our 
own life or homeworld in the sense of historical‑cultural horizon, but also the struc‑
ture providing for the establishment of intersubjective‑relative horizons of meaning, 
which constitute our cultural worlds. In the third Heretical Essay, Patočka writes: 
“Perhaps the most terrifying experience of meaninglessness is that presented by the 
devastation of partial meaningfulness, by the catastrophes of societies and spiritual 
worlds painstakingly built up over generations” (Patočka 1996, p. 73). This is pre‑
cisely what is being described as the phenomenon of the front.
What is important here is that what is ungrounded in the shaking experienced at 
the front are not (only) individual subjective horizons or individual aspects of the 
more generalized cultural lifeworld. It is not just the individual meaning structure 
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that is, for example, the university library or town hall, that is destroyed, but rather 
what we have called politically infrastructural meaning‑structures, the generative 
historical lifeworld as what Patočka calls the total horizons of “spiritual worlds built 
up over generations.”
There is of course a link between the destruction of individual meaning‑structures 
or entities and the total horizon of a spiritual world. It may be helpful to understand 
this idea of a total horizon of a spiritual world as a Gestalt structure, constituted or 
instituted diacritically in a constellation of all of its parts yet irreducible to them, 
and giving them their sense. This “total horizon” cannot survive the destruction of 
its particulars; or perhaps better, there is a threshold of destruction that it cannot 
survive. The reverse is also true: the particular or individuated meaning horizons of 
things cannot withstand the disintegration of the whole, e.g. the way an antique vase 
appears and is of interest to us as a relic or component of a bygone world, a horizon 
of sense that is no longer functional.
The materiality of the destruction that took place at the front in the First World 
War should not be underplayed here. Whole landscapes that had once been dotted 
with centuries‑old towns and villages were obliterated, literally reduced to holes in 
the ground. Patočka’s analysis of the peculiarity of the front line experience can be 
better understood in relation to Arendt’s comments in The Human Condition about 
the relation between the “products of work,” i.e. durable artifacts, and the possibility 
of having a world per se: “the products of work—and not the products of labor—
guarantee the permanence and durability without which a world would not be pos‑
sible at all” (Arendt 1958, p. 94).
The “solidarity of the shaken”
The “second phase” of the shattering experience of the front, corresponds to the 
emergence of what Patočka calls the “solidarity of the shaken” (Patočka 1996, pp. 
134–135). Amongst those who have undergone the experience of the front a new 
sense of solidarity emerges. This solidarity is not based on any political, cultural, 
or other institutional bonds that have been shaken in the epoché of the front. It is 
rather a community of those who have understood the relation between movement, 
the coming into being of the world, the self, and others that was revealed as the 
residuum of the revised conception of the epoché. The solidarity of the shaken is 
also a community of those who have chosen to accept the freedom in responsibility 
for what should be properly understood as bringing into being a world that could be 
otherwise in terms of its infrastructural institutions and their orientation toward the 
good, and bearing responsibility for that world. The radical freedom that comes with 
this sense of responsibility is the freedom of the solidarity of the shaken to remake 
their individual selves and the communities. Bringing together Patočka’s vocabular‑
ies: the solidarity of the shaken is a community of care for the soul in the phenom‑
enological sense that we described above.
We are in a better position now to understand Patočka’s preclusion of normali‑
zation or positive programmes on the part of the solidarity of the shaken. The 
solidarity of the shaken is a community formed in and from the neutralization of 
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institutions. The responsibility that Patočka seems to accord to this community is 
not the reconstruction of institutions but rather maintaining the space for their shak‑
ing, refusing to accept the sense of the institutions in question as simply given but 
always insisting on their character as ungroundable. Again, we can refer to Husserl 
who calls neutralization an abstention from producing anything. But this abstention 
from producing seems to directly conflict with the task of building a polis around 
the idea of care for the soul. The solidarity of the shaken is a solidarity of dissi‑
dence, of the quiet refusal of the prevailing institutional order. It is not the solidar‑
ity of revolutionaries bound together by a common project of constructing the polis 
anew. This revolutionary solidarity requires, as soon as the initial phase of revolu‑
tion is over, the establishment of stable and well‑grounded institutions. In Patočka’s 
terms, the properly political and truly historical activity of revolution, the shaking of 
accepted meaning, must quickly shed its true political sense and turn to the estab‑
lishment of a post‑political edifice of stable institutions if the revolution is to gain 
traction and last. There are good historical reasons why Patočka may have wished to 
maintain this tension between the shaking and rebuilding of the polis in his political 
writing of the 1970s. But an attempt to investigate what aspects of Patočka’s politi‑
cal thought may be developed into a more general theory of the political necessitates 
trying to negotiate, if not move beyond, this tension between epoché and institution.
Epoché and institution
Is there a way to mediate the tension between the polis as a radical ungrounding 
of institutions and the polis as institution(s), bearing in mind that institutions are 
necessary to life? To move beyond a politics of pure dissidence while retaining fidel‑
ity to the epoché as the core of the political, it seems necessary to conceive of a 
space within the institutional polis whose designated activity is the problematizing 
or ungrounding of the very institutions that support it.
Although Patočka has not offered any clear answer to this dilemma, we can read 
some of his writings as attempts to further elaborate the nature and potentialities 
of the fundamental contrast between epoché and institution. Once again, far from 
providing a political theory that might encompass these themes, Patočka has rather 
thematized this contrast in papers and seminars that require a thorough contextual‑
ization. One of these works—the aforementioned “Intellectuals and Opposition”—
cannot be understood outside the context of the social and political turmoils of the 
late 1960s. Stemming from a conference paper delivered in West Germany in June 
1968, at the peak of the Prague Spring, this work represents Patočka’s strongest 
attempt to identify a possible solution to this dilemma. For the first time, Patočka 
seems persuaded that, thanks to the development of mass culture based on techni‑
cal rationality and to the emergence of a new generation of world citizens willing 
to embrace this new culture, the traditional hiatus between intellectuals and society 
(i.e. between Socrates and his accusers) will gradually fade away. In other words, 
intellectuals will no longer need to be isolated oppositional figures, always aiming to 
trigger that political epoché which—as we have seen—would allow them to uproot 
those institutional meaning‑structures that prevent us from reaching higher levels 
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of human flourishing. To the contrary, these intellectuals finally have the opportu‑
nity to overcome the negativity of this epoché and to start imagining an institutional 
reconstruction after the existential shaking that they have gone through and that they 
have contributed to accelerating: “Until recently, intellectuals were an isolated or 
dispersed element that constituted a relatively negligible factor in public life due to 
their lack of numbers and dependence on decisive forces. […] Intellectuals are no 
longer powerless, at least not if they form groups and factions” (Patočka 2016, p. 8).
By intellectuals, or intelligentsia, Patočka has here in mind a large and organized 
group of individuals who are able to determine their goals freely, and who are will‑
ing to fight in order to defend this freedom. This determination to translate an intel‑
lectual vision into a political agenda is no longer seen at odds with the political epo‑
ché—whose movement is fundamentally negative and de‑institutionalizing—insofar 
as only by going through this epoché can we authentically determine what our goals 
are, in a free and autonomous way, i.e. without relying on the notions and traditions 
that characterize our lifeworld experience and that inevitably modify our course of 
action.
This rather optimistic picture is mitigated by three fundamental risks that 
Patočka envisioned at that time, and that take a greater prominence in his later 
works. First, instrumentality: These new intellectuals “must not stoop to what 
intellectuals used to be in the cultures of the past, at best, instruments in the 
hands of the ruling class”; second, mere uprootedness: “They must also not let 
themselves be neutralized to the level of ‘uprooted’ intellectuals of the modern 
age, and especially the bourgeois era,” to put it in other terms, they must not 
become victims of the same de‑institutionalizing epoché that they had the merit 
to ignite; third, pure negativity: “They are no longer powerless, but their power is 
purely destructive” (Patočka 2016, p. 11), that is to say, they must maintain a full 
grasp on the negative force that they have generated, and that is still looming over 
the polis. According to Patočka, these are the conditions whereby an intellectual 
can live freely and authentically in the changing reality of 1968, without sacrific‑
ing its oppositional drive, but directing it towards the formation of new societal 
value‑laden meaning‑structures. If these conditions are met, ideally, Socrates will 
be readmitted in the polis, at last. Another way in which Patočka attempted to 
portray this complex balance between ungrounding epoché and the foundation of 
new institutions is via the double metaphor of transcendence (Patočka 2016, pp. 
15–16). Human beings can experience two kinds of transcendence in their daily 
life. On the one hand, there is what he calls a “horizontal transcendence,” which 
consists of an impulse directed towards the world and towards things. This is the 
form of transcendence that characterizes historical and social progress, and that 
allows humans to progressively refine the material conditions of their existence. 
On the other hand, there is a “vertical transcendence,” which corresponds to the 
impulse to fundamentally disrupt and transcend what is given. Whilst the former 
kind of transcendence found its highest formulation in Hegel’s rational history 
and in Marx’s materialist conception of history, vertical transcendence concre‑
tized in Kant’s attempt to define a universal and necessary sphere of morality 
beyond mere factuality, and was later developed in Sartre and Merleau‑Ponty’s 
focus on the human impulse to go out of ourselves, which characterizes existence 
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as positive. These two versions of human transcendence can be easily associated 
with the (horizontal) tendency towards the institutionalization and expansion of 
shared meaning‑structures and the (vertical) tendency of epoché to uproot these 
structures, which inevitably breaks this horizontality, but that at the same time 
“gives room and space” for its reconstitution (Patočka 2016, p. 15). What is sig‑
nificant here is that Patočka maintains that the new intellectuals of his time must 
find a balance that will allow them to maintain both kinds of transcendence:
It seems to us that the task of the intelligentsia, their ‘issue’, is to maintain 
both of these ways of transcendence in their distinction and their reciprocal 
relationship. It is no longer simply a question of acknowledging the exist‑
ence of the ‘spiritual sphere’ and worshipping it in a quietist way, as in the 
classical and medieval ages, but rather of striving to establish the true gov‑
ernment of the spirit based on the revelation of the inadequacy of the factual 
world. (Patočka 2016, p. 15).
This complex balance, which corresponds to a renewed version of the care 
for the soul, informed by both the tendency of uprooting stable meanings and 
of founding new ones, was for Patočka a realistic goal in light of the social and 
political transformations of 1968. The only concern was to persuade the young 
intellectuals of this age to direct their negative impulse towards new institutions, 
beyond the instability of the present. Things changed rapidly after the failure of 
the Prague Spring and the beginning of the political normalization in Czecho‑
slovakia in 1969. From then on, epoché and institution uncoupled once again in 
Patočka’s thinking, leaving no space whatsoever for balance. This modified per‑
spective emerges in a seminar that Patočka held in 1975, “The Spiritual Person 
and the Intellectual,” whose text was published only after his death (Patočka, 
2002b). By “spiritual person,” Patočka means the true intellectual (“duchovní 
člověk” or “člověk ducha”—which sound like the French “homme d’esprit”—
are the same expressions that he used to define the new intellectuals in his 1968 
lecture “Intellectuals and the Opposition”), whereas the “intellectual” (which 
translates the pejorative “intelektuál”) is the “institutionalized,” regime‑aligned 
intellectual, who rejects the risks that the uprooting force of the political epoché 
implies, and decides to embed herself in the hierarchy of institutions, in order to 
avoid any existential shaking. In the new context of normalization, it is no longer 
possible to combine these two perspectives. More than ever, the political epoché 
seems to correspond to pure negative force, with no chance to turn it into a posi‑
tive agenda. Nonetheless, even in these difficult circumstances, Patočka does not 
give up the idea that this kind of epoché, or vertical transcendence, must have a 
political outcome:
The spiritual person is not of course a politician and is not political in the 
usual sense of this word. He is not a party to the dispute that rules this 
world—but he is political in yet a different way, obviously, and he cannot be 
apolitical, because he throws into the face of this society […] the problem‑
atic aspects of reality. (Patočka 2002b, p. 366).
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We have demonstrated here a productive and indeed constitutive tension 
between the concepts of epoché and polis (or institution) within the development 
of Patočka’s work. Rather than belonging to distinct and separate aspects of his 
oeuvre, the relation between the two demonstrates that the political and the phe‑
nomenological dimensions of his thought cannot be considered in abstraction 
from one another. Moreover, elaborating this central tension running through his 
work clarifies others key ideas, “care for the soul” and “solidarity of the shaken,” 
placing them with the context of the development of his phenomenology as well 
as his political writing. Finally, the distinction sheds further light on Patočka’s 
most explicitly concrete writings stemming from the hope of the Prague Spring 
and the desolation of “normalization,” situating them within the development of 
his rich political phenomenology.
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